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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Although this appeal arises out of two separate lawsuits and several years of 
litigation, the issues before this Court are very simple. This action arose from AIM's 
attempt - pursuant to a Deed of Trust and Promissory Note - to judicially foreclose on 
property to which appellee/cross-appellant James Edwards1 claimed an interest. 
Although the Estate of James Edwards is not a party to the Deed of Trust and Promissory 
Note, it continues to seek to enforce contractual remedies under the Deed and Note 
available only to AIM and the Note's borrower, Michael Flynn. The Estate's attempt to 
enforce these contractual rights must fail. 
As the trial court correctly determined, James Edwards never assumed any rights 
or obligations under the Deed of Trust and Promissory Note. Therefore, the Estate 
cannot seek to enforce the contractual rights of the borrower. Accordingly, the Estate's 
cross-appeal and opposition to AIM's appeal not only lack merit, but they are fatally 
defective due to the Estate's lack of standing to enforce these contractual rights and 
remedies. AIM therefore requests that this Court reverse the trial court's decision on the 
1
 In its opening brief, AIM referred to James Edwards, the only appellant in this 
matter as "Edwards." Following James Edwards' death, his son Bruce Edwards (also a 
former party in this matter) was appointed as the representative of the James Edwards 
estate. In an attempt to avoid confusion, AIM will refer to James Edwards and Bruce 
Edwards by their full names, and when appropriate, it will refer to the Estate of James 
Edwards (the appellant in this matter) as the "Estate." 
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limited issue relating to its denial of certain attorneys' fees, and deny the relief requested 
by the Estate. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Although the Estate includes seven pages of facts in its opening brief, there are 
only a handful of facts relevant to the Estate's cross-appeal of the district court's final 
order. AIM restates them here: 
1. On or about August 28, 1981, James M. Rothey and Beverley Rothey, as 
trustor, and Mountain West Savings & Loan, as beneficiary, executed a Deed of Trust 
and Promissory Note relating to certain real property located in Weber County, Utah. 
(R. at 653.) 
2. The rights and obligations under the Deed of Trust and Note were 
subsequently assumed from the Rotheys by Michael E. Flynn, while Mountain West 
Savings & Loan assigned its rights to AIM. (Id.) 
3. James and Helen Edwards purchased an interest in the real property 
through a sheriffs sale, subject to the Note and Deed of Trust. (Id.) 
4. Neither James nor Helen Edwards, nor their son Bruce Edwards, ever 
assumed, or attempted to assume, the Note and Deed of Trust. (Id.) 
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5. Michael Flynn, the borrower under the Note, has never claimed that his 
rights under the Note, including the right to notice, were violated. Michael Flynn has 
allowed all of his interest in the subject property to be extinguished. (R. at 700, at p.3.) 
III. 
ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO THE ESTATE'S CROSS APPEAL 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that James Edwards Lacked Standing 
to Challenge the Sufficiency of AIM's Notice of Default. 
The Estate of James Edwards seeks a reversal of the trial court's decision and a 
dismissal of AIM's claim for judicial foreclosure on the basis that AIM's notice of 
default was deficient. Specifically, the Estate argues that because AIM included in its 
notice of default a demand for certain attorneys' fees incurred to protect its interests, 
AIM's notice was defective and should preclude AIM's action to judicially foreclose on 
the subject property. The Estate's argument not only lacks merit, but the Estate lacks the 
standing to challenge the sufficiency of AIM's notice. Therefore, the trial court's 
decision should be affirmed. 
1. The Estate Lacks Standing to Challenge the Sufficiency of AIM's Notice. 
Following a two-day bench trial in this matter, the trial court entered the following 
finding of fact: 
Neither James, Helen [n]or Bruce Edwards (the "Edwards") ever assumed 
the Note and Deed of Trust, or attempted to assume the Note and Deed of 
Trust. Since they did not assume the Note and Deed of Trust, the Edwards 
did not become the "Borrower" under the Note and Deed of Trust, and are 
unable to claim or enforce the rights which the Note and Deed of Trust 
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grant exclusively to the Borrower, including the right to notice beyond 
what is required by law. 
(R. at 653.) On appeal, the Estate of James Edwards does not challenge the trial court's 
factual determination that neither James, Helen, nor Bruce Edwards assumed the Note 
and Deed of Trust.2 Nevertheless, the Estate claims that it was entitled to notice with an 
opportunity to cure under the contractual terms of those documents. The Estate is wrong. 
As repeatedly recognized by the Estate in its own brief, the right to notice under 
the Note and Deed of Trust belongs to the borrower. See Estate's Brief at 14 ("The 
promissory note of August 28, 1981, requires that the borrower be given notice of any 
delinquency and a 30 day period to cure ") (emphasis added); id. at 16 ("JT]he 
obligor under the note is entitled to advance notice of any claimed deficiency . . . .") 
(emphasis added); id. ("Under the terms of the promissory note, AIM was obligated to 
provide the borrower with advance notice of any nonperformance and a 30 day 
opportunity to cure.") (emphasis added). Because neither James nor Helen Edwards 
were borrowers or obligors under the Note, they were not entitled to the notice the Note 
2
 In fact, the Estate never directly addresses this issue in its brief. The Estate 
instead argues that the "obligor" and the "borrower" under the note are entitled to 
advance notice, but fails to offer any explanation of how James or Helen Edwards, who 
were neither obligors nor borrowers under the note, were entitled to the same notice. It 
should be noted, however, that in an apparent effort to avoid a judgment that they were 
entitled to pay AIM'S reasonable attorneys fees, James and Helen Edwards argued to the 
trial court below that AIM could not recover fees against them because "the Edwards 
have not signed the note." (R. at 505.) The Estate cannot have it both ways. It cannot 
argue that it is entitled to contractual rights under the Note and Trust Deed while 
simultaneously arguing that is not subject to any obligations thereunder. 
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required. This position is plainly supported by Utah law. In Johnston v. Austin. 748 
P.2d 1084, 1086, 1090 (Utah 1988), a case cited by the Estate, the Utah Supreme Court 
reversed a trial court which had ordered that a seller was required to give written notice 
of default under a real estate contract (including instructions to cure) to the buyer and 
each party claiming an interest in the property upon which the seller sought to foreclose.3 
The court concluded that defendant subpurchasers, who had not been assigned any rights 
under the real estate contract by the buyer, were "not in privity of contract" with the 
seller, and therefore could not seek to enforce the terms of the contract. Id. at 1090. 
Specifically, the Supreme Court stated: "[T]he [seller] ha[s] no legal duty under the 
contract to provide the subpurchasers with written notice of acceleration as required by .. 
. the contract." Id. Thus, "the written acceleration notice required by . . . the contract 
needed to be given only to [the buyer] and not to the subpurchasers." Id. at 1091 (Howe, 
J., concurring). Were this Court to conclude otherwise, the Court would be vesting non-
parties with rights under contracts to which they have assumed no obligations. Indeed, 
in this case, the Estate is not directly obligated to AIM under the Note and is not liable 
for any deficiencies. Where it has no contractual obligations to AIM, it likewise enjoys 
no rights. 
3
 Like this case, the contract in Johnston upon which the seller sought to foreclose 
included a notice provision requiring him to give written notice to the buyer of his intent 
to accelerate the debt and to foreclose on the property. Id. at 1085-86. 
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In addition to lacking its own contractual rights under the note, the Estate 
similarly lacks standing to enforce any contractual rights belonging to Michael Flynn, the 
borrower in this matter. Even assuming that the notice AIM provided was defective, 
Michael Flynn is the only party who could have challenged the sufficiency of the notice 
provided thereunder. In Garland v. Fleischmann. 831 P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1992), the 
Utah Supreme Court recognized as much when it held that a non-party to a contract 
could not raise a statute of frauds defense. The Court held that because the defendant 
was not a party to an earnest money agreement, and was not "in privity with a party to the 
contract," she was not entitled to raise the defense. Id The Court reasoned that "'[i]f the 
parties to the contract as in this case are willing to waive the requirements of the statute, 
a stranger to the contract cannot object.'" Id (quoting Zwaska v. Irwin. 144 A.2d 554, 
557 0958)): see also Shire Dev. v. Frontier Invs.. 799 P.2d 221, 222-23 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (recognizing the well-established principle that "only parties to a contract, or 
intended beneficiaries thereof, have standing to sue" under the contract). The reasoning 
is equally applicable here. Because Michael Flynn waived his contractual right to 
challenge the sufficiency of AIM's notice, the Estate, a stranger to the contract, cannot 
object.4 There is simply no basis for the Estate to assert the contractual rights of Michael 
4
 The Estate cites to no authority to support its position that it was entitled to 
contractual notice under the terms of the note to which it was not a party. Instead, the 
Estate relies exclusively on this Court's statements in Occidental/Nebraska Federal 
Savings Bank v. Mehr. 791 P.2d 217 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) and Jones v. Johnson. 761 
P.2d 37 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), to the effect that the objective of notice requirements are 
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Flynn to notice under the Note and Deed of Trust. The trial court's decision should 
therefore bt affirmed. 
2. AIM's Notice Satisfied the Terms of the Note. 
AIM believes that the Estate's lack of standing to challenge the sufficiency of 
AIM's notice is clear. However, even if this Court were to find that the Estate enjoyed 
privity of contract with AIM and is therefore entitled to enforce the terms of the Note 
relating to notice, the Estate's challenge must nevertheless fail. The Estate's challenge to 
AIM's notice is based exclusively on its belief that AIM improperly included certain 
attorneys' fees it had incurred in defense of the action brought by Bruce Edwards as due 
and payable under the note. Estate's Brief at 17. Specifically, the Estate believes that 
AIM is not entitled to collect those fees. Id. The Estate is mistaken. As found by the 
trial court in this matter, AIM is entitled to include the amounts it reasonably incurred in 
defending against Bruce Edwards' action in the amount due under the Note. (R. at 
to "protect the rights of those with an interest in the property to be sold." Estate's Brief 
at 16 (quoting Occidental). The Estate's reliance on these cases is misplaced. In neither 
case did this Court decide whether a nonparty to a contract could assert a right to 
contractually-mandated notice prior to the institution of a judicial foreclosure action. 
Instead, this Court was reviewing the sufficiency of the notice required by statute prior to 
a trustee's sale of real property. Occidental 791 P.2d at 219-20; Jones. 761 P.2d at 41 
n.2. Indeed, as made clear by the Jones court, the notice requirements of which it spoke 
were important because they provide protections "in lieu of the six month right of 
redemption guaranteed injudicial mortgage foreclosures." Id. Because this case 
involves a judicial foreclosure rather than a trustee's sale, the Estate's reliance on 
Occidental and Jones is tenuous, at best. 
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655-56). The fact that the Estate disputes AIM's entitlement to these fees does not 
render AIM's notice defective. 
Even more importantly, however, because AIM sought to foreclose on the 
property through a judicial foreclosure, pursuant to which all interested parties were 
allowed to appear and present any defenses they held to AIM's claim, AIM's notice was 
more than adequate. As evidenced by the fact that this litigation proceeded for nearly 
two years and culminated in a two-day bench trial, the notice provided the Estate with the 
opportunity to appear and present any defenses it had to AIM's claims. The Estate's 
position that it was somehow prejudiced by the contents of AIM's notice is simply 
unsupportable. 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Concluded that James Edwards Lacked Standing to 
Challenge the AIM's Entitlement to Attorneys' Fees Under the Note. 
The Estate's second point of appeal challenges the trial court's award of attorneys' 
fees to AIM on the basis that AIM did not give notice to "the note maker, subsequent 
assignee, or the property owners prior to engaging legal counsel and incurring attorneys 
fees and costs in the first lawsuit" brought by Bruce Edwards. Estate's Brief at 18. The 
Estate's argument may be disposed of for the same reasons articulated in response to the 
Estate's first point of error above. 
The Estate argues that the trial court erred in allowing AIM to include the 
attorneys' fees it incurred in defending against the action brought by Bruce Edwards as 
additional indebtedness secured by the trust deed. Id. The Estate's argument is based 
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again on the Deed of Trust to which it is not a party. Paragraph 7 of that Trust Deed 
states: "[I]f any action or proceeding is commenced which materially affects [AIM's] 
interest in the Property . . . then [AIM] at [AIM's] option upon notice to Borrower, may 
make such appearances, disburse such sums and take such action as is necessary to 
protect [AIM's] interests, including, but not limited to, disbursement of reasonable 
attorney's fees." Estate's Brief, Ex. B ^  7 (emphasis added). As noted by the Estate, "the 
obvious purpose of this notice requirement is to allow the borrower an opportunity to 
eliminate the default or resolve the threat to lender's security." Estate's Brief at 18 
(emphasis added). Thus, while the trust deed may have entitled the borrower (i.e., 
Michael Flynn) to notice of AIM's appearance to defend against the claims brought by 
Bruce Edwards relating to the property, the Estate was not contractually entitled to such 
notice. See supra at 3-5. Moreover, the Estate, which is not an assignee under the Note, 
does not have standing to challenge the sufficiency of the notice on behalf of Michael 
Flynn. See id. at 6-7. Thus, the trial court's decision on the Estate's second point of 
error should be affirmed.5 
5
 The Estate's argument on this point is particularly disingenuous given that 
James and Helen Edwards, although not contractually entitled to the notice anticipated by 
paragraph 7 of the note, clearly had notice that AIM engaged counsel to defend its 
interest in the property. The suit AIM was forced to defend against was brought by their 
son, Bruce Edwards, who they claim was their "managing agent." Estate's Brief at 19. 
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C. The Trial Court Correctly Included in the Final Judgment the Attorneys' 
Fees Reasonably Incurred by AIM in Defending Against the Action by Bruce 
Edwards. 
As noted above, included in the trial court's final judgment was an order allowing 
the reasonable attorneys' fees AIM incurred in defending against the action brought by 
Bruce Edwards as additional indebtedness secured by the trust deed. (R. at 654-55.) 
The Estate's third point of error attacks this part of the trial court's judgment on the basis 
that AIM's claim for the attorneys' fees and court costs it incurred in that matter are 
barred by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and equitable estoppel. 
Estate's Brief at 19. The Estate's argument fails for several reasons. 
1. The Estate Lacks Standing to Challenge Any Award of Attorneys' Fees. 
First, the Estate's argument should be rejected because of the Estate's lack of 
standing to raise it. AIM's right to recover attorneys' fees arises out of the Deed of Trust 
to which James and Helen Edwards were not parties. (R. at 654.) Thus, as a nonparty to 
the note, the Estate lacks standing to challenge an award of attorneys' fees. Indeed, AIM 
does not seek to enforce its judgment against the Estate; rather, these fees are included as 
part of the indebtedness secured by the note. As such, the Estate lacks standing to 
challenge their inclusion. See supra at 3-7. 
2. The Elements of Res Judicata Have Not Been Satisfied. 
The Estate's argument that AIM was precluded in this action from seeking fees 
incurred in the action brought by Bruce Edwards is based on a faulty application of the 
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doctrine of res judicata.6 The "doctrine of res judicata has two separate but related 
branches which can be asserted as affirmative defenses." Mel Trimble Real Estate v. 
Monte Vista Ranch. Inc.. 758 P.2d 451, 453 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The branch relied on 
by the Estate is the "second branch of res judicata" known as "collateral estoppel, or 
issue preclusion." Id. Collateral estoppel will not apply to bar a claim unless each of the 
following factors are met: (1) the issue was decided in a prior adjudication "identical 
with the one presented in the action in question;" (2) there was a "final judgment on the 
6
 Similarly, the Estate's argument that AIM's claim is barred by the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel is unfounded. In fact, although the Estate repeatedly refers to the 
doctrine of "equitable estoppel" in its brief, it never cites or applies the requisite standard 
necessary to satisfy the doctrine. See Estate's Brief at 19-23. The necessary elements of 
an equitable estoppel claim are 
(1) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party inconsistent 
with a claim later asserted; (2) reasonable action or inaction by the other 
part)' taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or 
failure to act; and (3) injury to the second party that would result from 
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such statement, 
admission, act, or failure to act. 
Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson. 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Moreover, the 
"application of the facts to the legal standard of equitable estoppel is a mixed question of 
fact and law," pursuant to which the Utah appellate courts grant "broadened discretion to 
the trial court." Id. In this case, the Estate fails to demonstrate that it raised the issue of 
equitable estoppel in the trial court, fails to marshal any evidence in support of a 
challenge to any factual findings by the trial court relating to this claim, and fails to 
demonstrate how the elements of the claim have been satisfied. Indeed, there is no 
evidence in the record before this Court that AIM has taken inconsistent positions with 
respect to its claim for attorneys' fees, that the Estate took or neglected to take action 
based thereon, or that injury to the Estate would result if AIM was allowed to contradict 
any such statement. Thus, the Estate's appeal of this award of attorneys' fees on the 
basis of equitable estoppel must be denied. 
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merits;" (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a 
party in the prior adjudication; and (4) the issue in the first case "was competently, fully, 
and fairly litigated." Id at 454 (quoting Searle Bros, v. Searle. 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 
1978)). A review of the record demonstrates that these elements were not met. 
First, there is no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the issue 
decided in the action brought by Bruce Edwards against AIM was identical to the one 
before the court below. Indeed, the issue before the court in the Bruce Edwards action 
related to Bruce Edwards' obligation to pay attorneys fees to AIM. The trial court in that 
action did not grant fees against Bruce Edwards, finding that "there does not exist privity 
of contract between [AIM and Bruce Edwards] such that Mr. Edwards can make 
demands on the mortgage company pursuant to the trust deed note, nor can the mortgage 
company make demands on Mr. Edwards to perform under the trust deed and note."7 (R. 
at 74) (emphasis added). 
In contrast, the issue presented to the trial court in this action was whether AIM 
could, under the Trust Deed and Note, include as additional indebtedness the attorneys' 
7
 The Estate argues that the trial court "[b]asically . . . found that AIM was 
equitably estopped by its own misconduct from recovering the substantial sums sought as 
. . . attorneys fees ... ." Estate's Brief at 20. There is no support in the record to support 
the Estate's position. The decision upon which the Estate relies does not even mention 
attorneys' fees. It states only that AIM is not entitled to recover "late fees and interest on 
the past due amount." (R. at 75.) The trial court in this action therefore correctly 
rejected the Estate's claims based on res judicata and collateral estoppel on the basis that 
trial court's decision below was based on a lack of privity between the parties and 
nothing more. See Transcript (R. 700 at pp.505-507.) 
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fees it incurred in the Bruce Edwards action as fees it necessarily and reasonably incurred 
in defending its interests in the property. AIM has not sought to relitigate the issue of 
whether it can recover those fees from Bruce Edwards; rather, it litigated before Judge 
West - for the first time - the issue of whether it was entitled to include the fees it was 
forced to incur pursuant to the contractual terms of the Deed of Trust as additional 
indebtedness secured by the terms of the Deed of Trust. The fact that Judge Heffernan 
denied AIM's request for attorneys' fees directly against Bruce Edwards (who enjoyed 
no privity of contract with AIM) did not preclude AIM from seeking to recover those 
fees under the terms of the Deed of Trust in this foreclosure action. The terms of the 
Trust Deed clearly entitle AIM to recover those fees; thus, the trial court below correctly 
determined that AIM was entitled to include them as additional indebtedness secured by 
the terms of the Deed of Trust.8 See Estate's Brief, Ex. B ^  18; Skach v. Gee. 484 
N.E.2d 441 (111. App. Ct. 1985) ("It is the general rule that a provision in a mortgage 
covering attorney fees and costs includes not only those fees incurred in connection with 
the foreclosure of the mortgage, but also any and all attorney fees and necessary expenses 
8
 In additional to failing to satisfy the first element of collateral estoppel, the 
Estate likewise fails to satisfy another critical element - that the issue of AIM's 
entitlement to these fees was competently, fully, and fairly litigated in the Bruce 
Edwards' action. The specific issue of whether Bruce Edwards was himself liable for 
attorneys fees was fully and fairly litigated. The issue of whether AIM was entitled to 
recover those fees in a foreclosure action based on the Deed of Trust was not. 
Furthermore, because the doctrine of collateral estoppel is an equitable one, it should not 
be applied here at the behest of Bruce Edwards (acting as personal representative of the 
Estate of James and Helen Edwards) where Bruce Edwards appeared before the trial 
court with unclean hands, representing himself to be a borrower under the Note. 
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incurred in collateral litigation in which the mortgagee may be a party by reason of his 
relation to the debt or the mortgage or deed securing it."). 
IV. 
ARGUMENT IN REPLY TO THE ESTATE'S OPPOSITION 
AND IN SUPPORT OF AIM'S APPEAL 
A. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Award a Portion of AIM's Attorneys 
Fees on the Basis that AIM Did Not Supplement Its Discovery Responses. 
1. The Estate Lacks Standing to Challenge AIM's Appeal Relating to the 
District Court's Failure to Award Certain Attorneys' Fees. 
The Estate argues that because of its interest in the real property, it has a right to 
appear in this matter and challenge AIM's appeal of the district court's denial of 
approximately $11,000 in attorneys fees. Estate's Brief at 29-30. Although AIM details 
the nature of its interest, it fails to directly address AIM's argument: that the Estate, as a 
nonparty to the Deed of Trust, lacks standing to challenge AIM's appeal of the denial of 
certain attorneys' fees under the Deed of Trust. As explained in AIM's opening brief, 
the district court held that because the Estate did not assume the Note or Deed of Trust, it 
has no rights under those documents. (R. at 653.) Rather, those rights belong 
exclusively to the borrower, Michael Flynn. Id Because of that lack of privity with 
AIM, the Estate will have no obligation to pay the additional fees AIM seeks and 
therefore has no standing to assert a defense to those claims. 
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2. The District Court Plainly Erred in Applying the Wrong Version of Rule 
26(e) to this Matter. 
Even assuming that the Estate has standing to challenge AIM's appeal of the 
district court's denial of attorneys' fees under the Deed of Trust, the Estate's opposition 
to AIM's appeal is not well founded. Recognizing that the trial court applied the wrong 
version of Rule 26(e), the Estate argues that the issue of which version of Rule 26(e) to 
apply was not raised before the trial court and therefore cannot be raised on appeal. AIM 
disagrees. The argument raised by AIM in its appellate brief is not a new argument; AIM 
clearly preserved this issue for appeal by challenging the trial court's order precluding 
the entry of evidence of certain of AIM's attorneys' fees as not supported by the 
discovery rules. Transcript (R. 700 at 124-25.) AIM's argument on appeal is simply 
new authority for the same argument it made below. 
However, even if this Court were to determine that AIM did not sufficiently 
preserve this issue below, because the trial court's application of the wrong version of 
Rule 26(e) constituted plain error, this argument may be raised for the first time on 
appeal. The doctrine of plain error is an exception to the rule that matters not presented 
to the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Cite. To find plain error, 
the Utah Supreme Court requires that the error be plain, "i.e., from our examination of 
the record, we must be able to say that it should have been obvious to the trial court that 
it was committing error," and that "the error be harmful." State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d 
29, 35 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted). Both elements are satisfied in this case. First, it 
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should have been obvious to the trial court that it was applying the wrong version of 
Rule 26(e). There can be no dispute that this case was filed before November 1, 1999, 
and there can be no dispute that Rule 26(e), as amended, applies only to cases filed after 
that date. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Committee Notes; R. at 1-26. Thus, it 
should have been obvious to the trial court that in applying the 1999 version of the rule, 
it was committing error. 
Furthermore, this error clearly harmed AIM. An error is harmful if "it is 
reasonably likely that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings." Cal Wadsworth 
Constr. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1378-79 (Utah 1995). By applying the 
wrong standard to AIM's obligations under the discovery rules, the trial court held AIM 
to a higher standard than the law required. And, because the trial court refused to allow 
AIM to present evidence at trial regarding certain of the attorneys' fees it had incurred, 
AIM was precluded from recovering those fees and was therefore undeniably harmed. 
3. AIM Satisfied the Requirements of the Utah Discovery Rules: The Trial 
Court Therefore Erred in Denying AIM the Opportunity to Present 
Evidence of Attorneys' Fees. 
In opposition to AIM's appeal, the Estate argues that under either the pre-1999 
version of Rule 26(e) or the post-1999 version, AIM failed to satisfy its duty to 
supplement its discovery responses, and thus the trial court properly excluded evidence 
of certain attorneys' fees at trial. Estate's Brief at 23-26. The Estate is wrong. 
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a) The Pre-1999 Version of Rule 26(e) 
The Estate argues that AIM failed to satisfy its obligations to supplement its 
responses to James and Helen Edwards' document requests even under the pre-1999 
version of Rule 26(e). Specifically, the Estate argues that "AIM had the responsibility .. 
to make new computer billings available to the adverse party to update and correct the 
amount of fees it would ultimately seek at trial." Estate's Brief at 27. AIM satisfied this 
standard. Indeed, AIM notified the Estate that the documents would be made available. 
(R. 271, 276.) That was all that AIM was required to do under Rule 34. Moreover, the 
pre-1999 version of Rule 26(e) imposes a duty to supplement only "by order of the court, 
agreement of the parties, or . . . through new requests for supplementation of prior 
responses." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(e) (1998). As the trial court correctly found, there was 
no agreement reached between the parties requiring supplementation, there was no order 
requiring AIM to supplement its responses, and the Estate did not renew its request prior 
to trial. Transcript (R. 700 at pp. 125-26.) The trial court's earlier order "to fully answer 
and comply" with certain requests identified in an Estate motion to compel did not 
impose an ongoing duty of supplementation. Similarly, the fact that the Estate had made 
an earlier request that AIM generally supplement its responses does not constitute an 
agreement by the parties to supplement. 
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b) The Post-1999 Version of Rule 26fe^ 
Even under the 1999 version of Rule 26(e), it is clear that the trial court erred in 
not allowing AIM to present evidence of its attorneys' fees. Rule 26(e) must be read in 
conjunction with Rule 34 which requires only that a party make documents available for 
inspection and copying. See Utah R. Civ. P. 34. AIM responded to the Estate's request 
for information regarding its billing records by stating that such information would be 
made available. (R. 271,276.) That is all Rule 34 requires of AIM. Utah R. Civ. P. 34. 
The obligations of Rule 26(e) to supplement outdated discovery responses cannot require 
that a party produce documents to opposing counsel when no such obligation is imposed 
under Rule 34. It can only require that the party continue to make such records available. 
Because AIM satisfied this standard, the trial court should be reversed.9 
9
 The Estate makes much of the fact that it had asked Edwards to produce the 
documents Edwards intended to use at trial. Estate's Brief at 26. These requests, 
however, predated AIM's offer to make its documents available to the Estate. The fact 
that the Estate chose not to take AIM up on its offer should not operate to prejudice 
AIM. Moreover, the Estate argues that the trial court's decision to preclude AIM from 
presenting evidence of its attorneys' fees was authorized by Rule 37. The Estate fails to 
recognize, however, that before a trial court can impose discovery sanctions under Rule 
37, the court must find on the part of the noncomplying party willfulness, bad faith,... 
fault,... or persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial process." Morton v. 
Continental Banking Co., 983 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 1997) (citations omitted). The trial 
court made no such findings in this case. AIM did not act in bad faith, nor did it wilfully 
disobey any discovery order of the district court. To the contrary, AIM believed that it 
had complied with the Estate's discovery requests by stating that the documents would be 
made available. Because AIM did not wilfully disobey any discovery order of the trial 
court, the court's exclusion of AIM's billing records as evidence in the case, causing 
damage to AIM in excess of $11,000, should be reversed. 
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V. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the arguments set forth in AIM's opening brief and this second appellate 
brief, AIM respectfully requests that this Court (1) correct the reversible error of the trial 
court, by allowing AIM to submit evidence that an additional and reasonable amount of 
$11,456.95 of attorneys' fees and costs were incurred between July 1999 and June 2000; 
(2) affirm the district court's order of foreclosure and award of attorneys' fees incurred 
by AIM in defending against the action brought by Bruce Edwards; and (3) enter an 
order allowing the reasonable attorneys' fees and costs arising from this appeal to be 
charged under the Note and Deed of Trust. These fees and costs have been necessarily 
incurred by AIM to protect its interests, and under the Deed of Trust, the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, and relevant case law, AIM is entitled to recover these additional 
costs and fees. See Estate's Brief Ex. B f 18; see also Utah R. App. P. 34 (award of 
costs); Valarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998) (quoting Utah Dep't of 
Social Servs. v. Adams. 806 P.2d 1193, 1197 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) stating that "when a 
party who received attorney fees below prevails on appeal, 'the party is also entitled to 
fees reasonably incurred on appeal'"). 
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